There's a newly discovered security vulnerability named POODLE:
The attack described above requires an SSL 3.0 connection to be established, so disabling the SSL 3.0 protocol in the client or in the server (or both) will completely avoid it. If either side supports only SSL 3.0, then all hope is gone, and a serious update required to avoid insecure encryption. If SSL 3.0 is neither disabled nor the only possible protocol version, then the attack is possible if the client uses a downgrade dance for interoperability.
As discussed in our post on Heartbleed and Octopus Deploy, we use the .NET framework's
SslStream class to set up a secure connection whenever the Octopus Deploy server and Tentacle deployment agents communicate.
When creating an
SslStream, you specify the protocols to use. .NET 4.0 supports SSL 2.0, 3.0, and TLS 1.0. .NET 4.5 supports SSL 2.0, 3.0, and TLS 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2.
Interestingly, the default protocol value (in both .NET 4.0 and 4.5) is
Tls | Ssl3. In other words, TLS 1.0 is preferred, but if the client/server only supports SSL 3.0, then it will fall back to that. As discussed in the paper, this is a problem even if your client/server support TLS, since an attacker could force a downgrade.
But there's good news - in Octopus, when we construct our
SslStream, we're specific about the protocol to use - we specifically limit the connection to TLS 1.0 (Octopus runs on .NET 4.0 so we can't do TLS 1.1/1.2 yet). Since we control both the client and server, we don't need to worry about falling back to SSL 3.0, so we don't allow it.
We've actually been doing this for a long time now; in January 2013 we published an open source project called Halibut, which was a prototype that eventually morphed into the communication stack we use between Octopus and Tentacle. Even back then we were specific about only supporting TLS:
ssl.AuthenticateAsServer(serverCertificate, true, SslProtocols.Tls, false);
Things are a little different with the Octopus web portal (the HTML web front end used to manage your Octopus server). The portal is hosted on top of HTTP.sys, the kernel-mode driver behind IIS. Out of the box the portal use HTTP, but you can configure your web portal to be available over HTTPS if you prefer.
From what I understand, IIS and HTTP.sys use whatever protocols are supported by SChannel, which means they'll allow SSL 3.0. It looks like a registry change is necessary to disable SSL 3.0 in SChannel in order to prevent IIS/HTTP.sys from using it.
Microsoft also have a security advisory that uses Group Policy to disable SSL 3.0, but it seems focussed on Internet Explorer and not IIS.
TL;DR: Octopus/Tentacle communication isn't affected by POODLE. The web portal (if you expose it over HTTPS) might be, just as any other site you serve over HTTPS using IIS might be.
As always, Troy Hunt has a good write up on the POODLE bug.